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CHARACTER EVIDENCE
teachers from adverse district court decisions will be virtually meaning-
less. The teacher's primary weapon has been the "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof imposed on the local school boards. On
review, that standard will be ignored. Furthermore, the court can
manipulate the "minutia of the evidence" phrase to avoid meaningful
review of the lower court's findings. The potential effect of Jones,
however, extends beyond the teacher employment discrimination issue.
In the past, appellate courts have delved into intricate evidence in other
kinds of employment discrimination cases to expose underlying dis-
crimination. The "minutia of the evidence" phrase can be easily
manipulated by a busy appellate court to avoid such time-consuming
analysis. If Jones represents the beginning of a trend in the extent
of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit, the right of appellate review
may become no more than a shadow of what it once was.
NIGLE B. BARRow, JR.
Evidence-A New Approach to Character Evidence in North
Carolina
In 1904 Professor Wigmore stated that although the Anglo-Ameri-
can rules of evidence had "taken some curious twistings in the course of
their development," none was more curious than the rule limiting the
admissibility of character evidence only to that of the general communi-
ty-reputation of 'the person in question.' This rule has generated con-
tinuous debate by legal theoreticians and scholars, but the case law has
remained unchanged for almost seventy-five years. State v. Stegmann
is another curious twist in this area of the law; the North Carolina
Supreme Court departed from precedent and the traditional rule and
held admissible testimony about the character and reputation of the
1. 11I J. WIGMORn, EVIDENCE § 1986 (1st ed. 1904). An analysis of this issue
must first differentiate between the terms "character" and "reputation." "Character"
refers to the actual qualities and characteristics of an individual, while "reputation" is
the esteem in which a person is held by others. I D. STANSHURY, NoRT- CARoLrNA
EVIENCE § 102 (Brandis rev. 1973). As the court stated in State v. Ussery, 118 N.C.
1177, 1180, 24 S.E. 414, 415 (1896), "Some critic has said that character lives in a
man-reputation outside of him." Unfortunately, judicial decisions have tended to use
the terms interchangeably and thus obscure the distinction. V J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE §
1608 (3d ed. 1940).
2. 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975).
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prosecutrix in a rape case based upon personal opinion and observation,
as well as upon her reputation within the community.' This decision thus
represents a major change in the permissible forms of proving an
individual's character in North Carolina.
John Richard Stegmann was charged with the abduction and rape
of Ruth O'Leta Kendall on September 4, 19734 and was convicted on
both counts.5 At trial, the defendant alleged that the prosecutrix had
consented to the sexual intercourse with him,6 and thereby placed the
question of her character in issue.7 !n response, the district attorney
introduced the testimony of fourteen witnesses to show the good charac-
ter and reputation of the complainant.8 The first two witnesses testified
"properly" as to her good general reputation in the community in which
she lived,9 and no exception was taken to their testimony. 10 However,
when examining the other twelve witnesses, after receiving an answer to
his question about the general reputation of Mrs. Kendall, the district
attorney went on to ask each witness, "On what do you base your
opinion?"'1 Eleven answered that their opinions were based upon her
general reputation as well as upon their personal opinions about and
observations of her."2 One witness stated that her opinion was based
solely upon her personal contact with the prosecutrix.'3  The defend-
ant's second and third assignments of error were based on the trial
judge's admission of this testimony.'"
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ver-
dict and judgments,' 5 abandoning the traditional North Carolina rule
3. Id. at 649, Z13 S.E.2d at 271.
4. Id. at 640, 213 S.E.2d at 265.
5. Id. at 643, 213 S.E.2d at 267. Stegmann received a life sentence for the
kidnapping charge and a death sentence for the rape charge.
6. Id. at 642-43, 213 S.E.2d at 267.
7. Cf. State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 917 (1960); State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897); State v. Daniel,
87 N.C. 507 (1882); State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 305 (1846); 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § '105 (Brandis rev. 1973). See text accompanying notes 19-20
infra.
8. 286 N.C. at 644-46, 213 S.E.2d at 267-69.
9. Le., in keeping with the traditional rule, they testified only to her general
community reputation and did not speak of their personal opinions of her character or of
specific acts or conduct of the prosecutrix.
10. 286 N.C. at 644, 213 S.E.2d at 267 (witnesses Frazee and Smith).
11. Id. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
12. Id. at 644-45, 213 S.E.2d at 268-6 (witnesses Hopkins, Judson, Godwin,
Ledbetter, Porter, Parker, M. Reinburger, C. Reinburger, Riggin, Cimaglia and Peases).
13. Id. at 645-46, 213 S.E.2d at 269 (witness Harris).
14. Id. at 643, 213 S.E.2d at 267.
15. 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E.2d 262 (1975). The majority opinion was written by
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that character may not be evidenced by the opinion of the character
witness or by specific acts of the person in question.16 The court held
that the district attorney's question "and the answers thereto tended to
show the foundation for the character evidence given by the witnesses. A
strong or weak foundation for the testimony of a witness aids the jury in
determining the weight it will give that testimony. Thus, the question
was properly permitted. .... ,,17 The court did, however, find the trial
judge in error in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Harnis, which was
based solely on personal opinion.'8 In effect, the court held admissible
testimony based in part on personal observation and in part on general
community reputation.
The general rule in the United States is that when seeking to prove
a person's character as a collateral matter,' 9 the witness may testify only
about the general reputation of the person in question in the community
in which he lives. The witness is not permitted to teslify about the
person's specific acts or about the witness's personal knowledge or
beliefs.20  This general preference in favor of the indirect method of
evidencing character by reputation, as opposed to the direct method of
proof by personal opinion, has arisen despite serious questions raised by
Professor Wigmore concerning the historical foundations of the rule.2 '
Justice Huskins. Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Copeland both dissented as to the death
sentence for the rape conviction. Justice Exum filed a long dissenting opinion based
upon his belief that "the only method of proof previously sanctioned by this Court and
most other jurisdictions is by showing the general reputation of the witness in the
community where she lived," excluding testimony based on personal opinion. Id. at 659,
213 S.E.2d at 277.
16. Id. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 649, 213 S.E.2d at 271.
19. Character is a collateral issue in a case when it is offered as evidence of the
person's conduct on a particular occasion or of his truthfulness and veracity in general.
For purposes of this note, no attempt will be made to differentiate between the various
situations in which character evidence may come into issue, e.g., the character of the
accused in a criminal proceeding, the character of a witness who has given testimony, the
character of a complainant in a rape case, the character of a party to a civil suit, the
character of the deceased in a homicide case, etc. Both the majority and minority rules
with regard to personal opinion evidence apply equally in all situations.
20. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948); 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 110 (Brandis rev. 1973); VII J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1980 (3d
ed. 1940).
21. VII J. WIaMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1981-82 (3d ed. 1940). In tracing the history
of the rule, Wigmore demonstrates that prior to 1865, the universal practice was to
permit character witnesses to state their personal opinions of the individual in question.
E.g., Trial of Cowper, 13 How. St. Tr. 1106, 1180 (1699); Trial of Hardy, 24 How. St.
Tr. 199, 999 (1794); Case of Davison, 31 How. St. Tr. 99, 190 (1808); Trial of Jones,
31 How. St. Tr. 251, 310 (1809). This orthodox practice was altered by the decision in
R. v. Rowton, Leigh & C. 520, 10 Cox Cr. Rep. 25 (Eng. 1865), where the court
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Prior to the decision in State v. Stegmann, North Carolina followed
the majority rule.22 As stated in Johnson v. Massengill:23 "The gen-
eral rule is that a witness, offered to prove the character of another
person, may not testify as to his personal opinion concerning the repu-
tation of such other person but is limited to testimony concerning the
character of such person in the community.
24
The vast majority of other jurisdictions in the United States follow
the limited rule.2 5 The United States Supreme Court has spoken to this
issue only once, in Michelson v. United States,6 which was heavily
relied upon in the dissent in Stegmann. Although the Michelson Court
approved the general rule, it did so in less than unqualified terms. The
Court first discounted the importance of its conclusion by speaking of its
ignored a long line of precedents and held that testimony based on personal opinion
alone was inadmissible and that the question to the witness must be framed in terms of
the reputation of the individual in question. Wigmore believes this decision to be based
in part upon a misunderstanding of a statement made by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in
Jones' Trial, 31 How. St. Tr. 310 (1809), that 'It is reputation; it is not what a person
knows" that may be used to prove character. Wigmore contends that this remark refers
to the exclusion of particular facts attempting to demonstrate a specific trait, and not to
the witness's speaking from personal knowledge. VII J. WIGMoRE, EVIDECB § 1982, at
146-47 (3d ed. 1940).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. Massengill, 280 N.C. 376, 186 S.E. 2d 168 (1972); State
v. McKissick, 271 N.C. 500, 157 S.E.2d 112 (1967); State v. Steen, 185 N.C. 768, 117
S.E. 793 (1923); Edwards v. Price, 162 N.C. 243, 78 S.E. 145 (1913); Bottoms v. Kent,
48 N.C. 154 (1855); State v. Parks, 25 N.C. 296 (1843). See also 1 D. STANSOURY,
NQRTH CAROLINA EVm CE § 110 (Brandis rev. 1973).
23. 280 N.C. 376, 186 S.E.2d 168 (1972).
24. Id. at 383, 186 S.E.2d at 173. There is one North Carolina decision that
possibly cuts the other way. In State v. Nance, 195 N.C. 47, 141 S.E. 468 (1928), the
court held that a witness, after stating the general character of the individual inquired
about, may of his own accord say in what respect the person's character is good or bad.
One writer has viewed this case as upholding the use of personal opinion. Ladd,
Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REv. 498, 512 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Ladd]. Presumably, a witness could amplify his conclusion as to a
person's character by stating that it was based on personal observation. However, the
later case of State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 157 S.E. 851 (1931) seems to indicate that
Nance was meant to allow the witness to qualify his conclusion "by adding that [the
person's character] is good for certain virtues and bad for certain vices," thus limiting
any elaborations to references to specific traits of character. Id. at 541, 157 S.E. at 852.
25. See, e.g., Deschenes v. United States, 224 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Neff, 343 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 475 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1973);
People v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 P. 372 (1901); People v. Gordon, 103 Cal. 568, 37 P.
534 (1894); Gifford v. People, 148 Ill. 173, 35 N.E. 754 (1893); Hischman v. People,
101 Ill. 568 (1882); Borders v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 577, 67 S.W. 2d 960 (1934);
State v. Harrison, 168 La. 1115, 123 So. 800 (1929); State v. King, 78 Mo. 555 (1883);
State v. Pearce, 15 Nev. 188 (1880); State v. Todd, 28 N.M. 518, 214 P. 899 (1923);
People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907); State v. Magill, 19 N.D.
131, 122 N.W. 330 (1909); Commonwealth v. Gaines, 167 Pa. Super. 485, 75 A.2d 617
(1950); Prater v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 669, 284 S.W. 965 (1926); State v. Williams, 38
Wyo. 340, 266 P. 1056 (1928).
26. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
lack of expertise in the field of evidence in general. 27  The Court then
endorsed the majority rule, primarily because it was loath to make
sweeping changes in the established law, and because the Court saw
itself as an improper forum in which to fashion rules of procedure and
evidence for state courts.28 Significantly, Michelson did not deal with
the issue in constitutional terms,29 thus leaving it to the states to decide
the matter for themselves. For all these reasons, Michelson should not
be viewed as a preemptive or controlling decision in the area of charac-
ter evidence.
In spite of the number of jurisdictions that adhere to the majority
position, a few states, most notably Iowa ° and Minnesota,"' have stated
that charcter evidence based upon a witness's personal observations of
the person in question is as competent and worthy of consideration as
evidence of that person's general reputation.
32
Underlying the debate over the proper form of proof in this area
are conflicting policy considerations. Two major propositions are often
stated in support of the majority rule. First, there are the "overwhelm-
ing considerations of practical convenience." 3 As stated in People v.
Van Gaasbeck:34
If a witness is to be permitted to testify to the character of an ac-
cused party, basing his testimony solely on his own knowledge and
observation, he cannot logically be prohibited from stating the par-
ticular incidents affecting the defendant and the particular actions
of the defendant which have led him to his favorable conclusion.
In most instances, it would be utterly impossible for the prosecution
27. This is because the law of evidence is normally developed by state courts of the
last resort and due to the paucity of occasions that the Supreme Court has to rule on
such matters. Id. at 486.
28. Id.
29. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563 (1967).
30. See State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76, 25 N.W. 936 (1S85); accord, State v.
Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 270 N.W. 874 (1937); State v. Richards, 126 Iowa 497, 102
N.W. 439 (1905).
31. See State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407 (1876). See also Richmond v. Norwich, 96
Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907);
Mathewson v. Mathewson, 81 Vt. 173, 69 A. 646 (1908); State v. Hosey, 54 Wash. 309,
103 P. lZ (1909).
32. It is important to note that the minority rule does not seek to exclude evidence
of general reputation. It merely holds evidence based on personal opinion to be on an
equal footing in terms of relevance and credibility and hence admissibility.
The MODEL CoDE OF EviDENcE rule 306 (1942) would allow opinion evidence, as
well as evidence of general reputation, as proof of the character of the accused in a
criminal action. The Uriuoi.m RuLEs OF EVIDENCE rule 608(a) (1974) would permit
opinion evidence concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness.
33. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 418, 82 N.E. 718, 721 (1907).
34. 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907).
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to ascertain whether occurrences narrated by the witness as consti-
tuting the foundation of his conclusions were or were not true.
They might be utterly false, and yet incapable of disproof at the
time of trial. Furthermore, even if evidence were accessible to
controvert the specific statements of the witness in this respect, its
admissibility would lead to the introduction into the case of in-
numerable collateral issues which could not be tried out without
introducing the utmost complication and confusion into the trial,
tending to distract the minds of the jurymen and befog the chief
issue in litigation.3 5
This fear of opening up "a history of the person's whole life" at trial and
thus diverting the focus of the proceeding and the attention of the jury
has been expressed in a number of North Carolina cases.30
The second argument supporting the majority rule is based upon
the fear that the personal opinion given by the witness may be based
upon personal prejudice towards the individual in question or upon a
misinterpreted or unrepresentative experience with that person.37  Not
only would testimony founded on such inadequate bases not be proba-
tive, but it could also lead into a discussion of specific acts of the person
in question, which is universally condemned.33 For these reasons,
among others," most courts have believed that reliability and credibility
are gained by the use of the opinion of the community as a whole as
opposed to that of a single individual.
Professor Wigmore was one of the earliest and most ardent sup-
porters of the liberal minority position, and one of the most vociferous
critics of the majority rule. 0 He argued that personal observations and
opinion were simply a more credible and reliable form of proof and that
35. Id. at 418, 82 N.E. at 721.
36. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 193 N.C. 581, 137 S.E. 657 (1927); Edwards v.
Price, 162 N.C. 243, 78 S.E. 145 (1913); Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N.C. 154 (1855). See
also 1 D. STAsiwRy, NoRTu CAROLINA EvmENcE § 110, at 336-37 n.91 (Brandis rev.
1973); Sizemore, Character Evidence in Criminal Cases in North Carolina, 7 WAxE
FoREST L. REv. 17, 19 (1970).
37. Ladd, supra note 24, at 511, citing Phillips v. Kingfield, 19 Me. 375 (1841);
State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 P. 237 (1929); Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 S. & R. 336, 8
Am. Dec. 655 (Pa. 1817).
38. 1 D. STANsBuRY, NORTH CAROLiNA EVDENCE § 110, at 336-37 & n.91 (Brandis
rev. 1973). See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
39. A number of other less important and less persuasive policies have been
advanced in favor of the majority rule, including: the fear that testimony based on
personal observations would violate the opinion rule, Sizemore, Character Evidence in
Criminal Cases in North Carolina, 7 WAKE Forsr L. Rnv. 17, 19 (1970); that such
evidence would invade the province of the jury, as it is their job to infer character from
the facts, Ladd, supra note 24, at 510; and that reputation is a fact which may be
presented to the jury and utilized by them as a basis to evaluate character, id.
40. See note 21 supra.
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it would be preferred both by the parties and by jurors.41 Professor
Stansbury contends that although attorneys and judges may know that
the witness should limit his testimony only to that of general reputation,
the layman is not so schooled in the ways of the law. The practical
result is that often the witness will state what is in fact his personal
opinion of the person in question, although couching it in. terms of the
person's general reputation in the community. Stansbury, therefore,
argues that a more realistic approach would be to admit testimony based
clearly and solely on the witness's personal opinion.42
Court decisions upholding the minority rule have relied on yet
another theory to support their position. In both State v. Sterrett3 and
State v. Lee,44 the two leading minority view cases, the courts reasoned
that since the purpose of the introduction of character evidence is to
present a foundation for a presumption by the jury that the person in
question acted in a certain way, the crucial question becomes whether
the person in fact possesses a certain disposition and not whether he is
reputed to be of such disposition. Therefore, the personal opinion of
the witness as to the person's character is evidence of that fact and is of
equal competence to testimony of the reputation of the person's charac-
ter. Although other equally persuasive arguments have been made,45
these policies are the most popular justifications cited for the minority
rule.
With this long standing theoretical controversy and the prior devel-
41. VII J. WIGMORE, EviDENcB § 1986 (3d ed. 1940). "So far as practical policy
and utility is concerned, there ought to be no hesitation between reputation and personal
knowledge and belief." Id. at 166.
42. 1 D. STANSBuRY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 110, at 336-37 n.99 (Brandis
rev. 1973); cf. Ladd, supra note 24, at 517, wherein the author states: "When reputation
for character is offered . . . , the jury undoubtedly regard [sic] the statement of the
accused's reputation as corresponding to the opinion of the witness."
43. 68 Iowa 76, 78-79, 25 N.W. 936, 937-38 (1885).
44. 22 Minn. 407, 409-10 (1876).
45. See Ladd, supra note 24. Reliance upon reputation as evidence is a throwback
to the days of small, rural communities. In view of toaay's complex, urban society
however, witnesses have little contact with the person in question other than personal
observation. As a result, their testimony concerning the person's community reputation
is, in reality, personal opinion evidence in the guise of reputation. Id. at 515, citing
Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937); accord, State v. McEachern, 283
N.C. 57, 194 S.E.2d 787 (1973) (evidence of good character is no longer confined to
reputation in the community in which a person lives), overruling sub silentio State v.
Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 195 S.EB 72 (1938).
The fear expressed in the majority rule jurisdictions that personal opinion testimony
will be based on prejudice or isolated or trivial experiences (see text accompanying notes
37-38 supra) can be overcome by the device of cross-examination and requirements
relating to the laying of a proper foundation for the character witness's testimony. Ladd,
supra note 24, at 518.
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opment of North Carolina case law in mind, the holding and the
implications of the decision in Stegmann can properly be analyzed.
First, the North Carolina Supreme Court did not completely embrace
the minority rule. By excluding the personal opinion testimony of Mrs.
Harris, but admitting that of the other witnesses, 40 the court espoused a
middle ground. Clearly, testimony based solely on general reputation
will continue to be admissible, while that based solely on personal
opinion will be excluded. However, the holding of the case now makes
it permissible to introduce evidence consisting of both personal opinion
and observation and general reputation testimony. The district attor-
ney's question, "On what do you base your opinion?", although criti-
cized by the court as being "unnecessary and ineptly phrased"47 will not
constitute reversible error, and thus is allowable.
One problem in attempting to define the scope of Stegmann is that
the court, in adopting this new rule, did not give a detailed discussion of
the possible policy justifications for its decision. The reason given by
the court for the decision 48 seems to fall within the policy adopted by the
other minority state courts:49 since the issue before the court is the fact
of the person's disposition, personal opinion testimony is competent
proof of such fact. The court did not cite those opinions, however, and
it was silent as to the other popular policies in favor of the minority
rule. 5
0
The court's partial adoption of the minority rule can be criticized
for taking a "half a loaf' approach. The personal observations of a
witness, now allowed by the court, will assist the jury in evaluating the
character evidence introduced. However, one can argue that jurors will
likely not differentiate between the community-reputation evidence and
the personal opinion evidence and so will not use the latter only to
reinforce the former, as the court apparently intends. Professors Stans-
bury and Ladd believe that jurors already tend to interpret reputation
testimony as consisting of the personal opinion of the witness.51 The
new rule increases this likelihood of jury confusion, so the court should
drop its charade, recognize the practicalities of the situation and admit
personal opinion evidence per se.
46. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
47. 286 N.C. at 647, 213 S.E.2d at 269.
48. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra. Nor did the court refer to the
decisions or policies which support the majority position.
51. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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Furthermore, by recognizing the probative value of personal opin-
ion testimony under limited circumstances, the court should go on to
realize that the same value is present when the personal opinion testimo-
ny comes in by itself and that safeguards are available to prevent any
adverse effects of such an offer of proof.52 Having acknowledged the
value of the evidence, there is no justification for the court's not differ-
entiating between evidence of reputation and of personal knowledge and
belief as suggested by Professor Wigmore. 53 In short, there would seem
to be no reason why the court, if it is disposed to move away from the
majority rule, should not completely embrace the minority position. As
stated by Professor Ladd, "[t]he emphasis upon the means of proving
character should be directed to the probative quality of the -testimony to
be obtained rather than to the formalistic procedure of satisfying the de-
mands of legal ritual."
' 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Stegmann
raises almost as many questions as it answers and will obviously need
clarification in later cases. However, it seems to represent the first
tentative steps on the part of the court to adopt a new approach to the
controversial area of character evidence. At least for the time being, it
is clear that character testimony may consist of both the general reputa-
tion of the individual in question and personal observations and opin-
ions of the witness concerning the person in question. This is a new
rule, and practicing attorneys in North Carolina should take careful note
of it.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS
Federal Courts-Bradford v. Weinstein: The Federal Courts
Reopen the Door to Prisoners' Civil Rights Claims
Since the mid-1960's the federal courts have witnessed a tremen-
dous influx of state prisoner petitions. 1 Claimants have sought civil
52. Proper requirements for laying a foundation for a witness's testimony and for
cross-examination will serve to exclude testimony with an inadequate basis or founded
on personal prejudice. Likewise, control of the proceedings by the presiding judge will
avert a degeneration of the testimony into a listing of specific acts of the person in
question or a recounting of his life's history, which are both still condemned.
53. VII I. WIGMOM, EVIDENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940).
54. Ladd, supra note 24, at 517-18.
1. Petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal courts totaled 13,423 in 1974, an
increase of 1,439.3% over the total in 1960. The 1974 total is more than double the
1976] 1049
